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not affected by the imposition of a charge upon those able to
pay.
From the Louisiana jurisprudence, it is apparent that, re-
gardless of the precise ground of immunity, 8 a charity is not
liable for the torts of qualified servants. There is no Louisiana
decision dealing with the liability of a charitable institution for
the negligence of its managers in selecting incompetent sub-
ordinate agents. In a number of cases there are sporadic state-
ments to the effect that a charitable hospital is not liable for the
torts of servants selected with due care.'9 The significance of such
statements is not clear. One might infer that liability will be
imposed. where there is a lack of due care in the selection of
servants.20 On the other hand, it might be contended that such
statements were merely precautionary and bounded the issue
presented by the particular facts under consideration. 2'
F. H. O'N.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE--SECURITY CLAUSE AS A POTESTATIVE CON-
DITION-The vendee of an automobile executed notes secured by
a chattel mortgage which the vendor transferred to the plaintiff.
Acting under a clause of the mortgage which gave the mortgagee
the right to declare the notes immediately due and payable if he
deemed himself insecure, the plaintiff obtained an order of ex-
ecutory process against the vendee. Held, the clause in question
is null as a potestative condition under Articles 2024 and 2034 of
the Civil Code. Motors Securities Co., Inc. v. Tullos, 178 So. 634
(La. App. 1938).
18. All of the various theories of immunity are discussed in the Louisiana
cases; from the cases as a whole it is not clear upon which theory Louisiana
courts base their decisions.
19. See Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726, 730-731 (La. App. 1922);
Thibodaux v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 11 La. App. 423, 428,
123 So. 466, 470 (1929).
20. In the following cases, where the servants were not selected with
due care, the charity was held liable: St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson,
178 Tex. Civ. App. 108, 164 S.W. 36 (1914); Roberts v. Ohio Valley General
Hospital, 198 W.Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925). Cf. Lindler v. Columbia Hospital
of Richland County, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914). See also Rhodes v. Millsaps
College, 179 Miss. 596, 618-620, 176 So. 253, 255 (1937).
21. As was said by the Massachusetts court of a similar statement in
Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 70, 126 N.E. 392, 394
(1920): "It simply showed the extent of the decision. It does not purport to
be a comprehensive or exclusive statement. The correlative assertion, to the
effect that there is liability of the hospital in cases where there has been
carelessness on the part of the managers In the selection of servants and
agents, is neither expressed nor implied." For cases holding charitable agen-
cies Immune from liability for negligence in the selection of agents, see
Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31 F. (2d) 869 (C.C.A. 4th,
1940] NOTES
The decision in this case is in conflict with the established
jurisprudence of other states,1 a fact not recognized in the opin-
ion. While such security clauses are by no means devoid of legal
problems, in none of the -other states have they been found utterly
unenforceable. Of course the potestative condition is peculiar
to the civil law, but it would be a mistake to believe that what-
ever wisdom it enfolds is unknown to our sister system. The con-
flict in other jurisdictions manifests itself in three variant in-
terpretations of these clauses.2 One view is that such a clause
vests absolute discretion in the mortgagee as to when there is
insecurity.8 Another is that the mortgagee may exercise this con-
dition only if there is a reasonable insecurity.4 Finally, it has been
held that the mortgagee must act in good faith and upon facts
rendering his debt insecure.5
There is nothing in our chattel mortgage statute which
would justify the rule of the present case. On the other hand, the
code articles and cases dealing with potestative conditions, if cor-
rectly construed, would uphold the validity of such a clause, even
if it were meant to give the mortgagee unlimited discretion as
to when to foreclose. This follows from Article 20347 which de-
1929); Bodenheimer v. Confederate Memorial Ass'n, 68 F. (2d) 507 (C.C.A.
4th, 1934); Vermillion v. Women's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E.
649 (1916). Cf. Fordyce & McKee v. Women's Christian Nat'l Library Ass'n,
79 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 485 (1906).
1. Manufacturers' Finance Acceptance Corp. v. Woods, 222 Ala. 329, 132
So. 611 (1931), noted (1931) 17 Va. L. Rev. 826; Thorp v. Fleming, 78 Kan. 237,
96 Pac. 470, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 915, 130 Am. St. Rep. 366 (1908); Englund v.
Souther, 22 N.D. 261, 133 N.W. 301, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1095 (1911); Johnson v.
Thayer, 53 Ohio App. 25, 4 N.E. (2d) 172 (1936), noted (1937) 11 U. of Cin. L.
Rev. 291; 2 Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales (Bowers' 6th ed.
1933) 18, § 331.
2. For a discussion of this, see Englund v.'Souther, 22 N.D. 261, 265, 133
N.W. 301, 303, Ann.' Cas. 1914B, 1095, 1097 (1911).
3. Cline v. Libby, 46 Wis. 123, 49 N.W. 832, 32 Am. Rep. 700 (1879); Hill v.
Meriman, 72 Wis. 483, 40 N.W. 399 (1888).
4. Roy v. Goings, 96 Ill. 361, 36 Am. Rep. 151 (1880); Deal v. D. M. Osborne
and Co., 42 Minn. 102, 43 N.W. 835 (1889); 2 Jones, Chattel Mortgages and
Conditional Sales (Bowers' 6th ed. 1933) 189, § 431(a).
5. Hawver v. Bell, 64 Hun. 636, 19 N.Y. Supp. 612 (1892); Oppenheimer
v. Moore, 107 App. Div. 301, 95 N.Y. Supp. 138 (1905); 2 Jones, Chattel Mort-
gages and Conditional Sales (Bowers' 6th ed. 1933) 192, § 431(b). See also
Englund v. Souther, 22 N.D. 261, 133 N.W. 301, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1095 (1911)
and authorities cited therein.
6. La. Act 65 of 1912, as amended by La. Act 155 of 1914; La. Act 18 of
1915 (E.S.); La. Act 151 of 1916; La. Act 198 of 1918; La. Act 81 of 1922; La.
Act 232 of 1924; La. Act 189 of 1932; La. Act 178 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 5022-5033]. See also La. Act 119 of 1924 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5034] and La.
Act 157 of 1918 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §H 5035-5036].
7. Art. 2034, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Every obligation is null, that has
been contracted, on a potestative condition, on the part of him who binds
himself."
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clares null only those obligations based on a potestative condition
on the part of the obligor." The mortgagee who is allowed the
option is not the obligor, but the obligee. Furthermore, the opin-
ion is innaccurate in declaring the potestative condition null, for
Article 2034 provides only that the obligation contracted on a
potestative condition is null. This provision confers no authority
therefore, for annulling a potestative condition which makes part
of an enforceable contract.9
The better reasoned cases at common law have required a
reasonable insecurity before permitting the mortgagee to fore-
close.10 There is nothing in our Code requiring a different result,
nor would public policy be offended by allowing to mortgagees
the protection of such an option if" it is relied on only when the
circumstances warrant its use. v..
W. M. S
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FOREIGN CHATTEL MORTGAGE NOT RECORD-
ED IN LOUISIANA-RIGHTS OF INNOCENT PURCHASER-Plaintiff, the
assignee of a Missouri vendor, seeks to enforce a chattel mort-
gage given on an automobile which the Missouri vendee subse-
quently removed to Louisiana. The defendant purchased the car
in Louisiana, and gave in payment therefor a note secured by a
chattel mortgage. Both chattel mortgages were valid under the
laws of their respective states. The present holder of the Lou-
isiana mortgage intervened, contending that the Missouri mort-
gage had no effect in Louisiana because it had not been recorded
here. Held, that in the absence of recordation in this state the
Missouri mortgage has no effect against a third party purchaser
in good faith. Judge Janvier dissented on the ground that a chat-
tel mortgage valid against third parties in the state where it was
given was also valid in Louisiana. General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Nuss, 192 So. 248 (La. App. 1939).
In cases involving conditional sales contracted in another
jurisdiction, recovery by the vendor is allowed if at the time of
execution is was not contemplated that the property would be
8. Conques v. Andrus, 162 La. 73, 110 So. 93 (1926); La Salle Extension
University v. Thibodaux, 155 So. 53 (La. App. 1934); Gumbel Realty and
Securities Co. v. Levy, 156 So. 70 (La. App. 1934).
9. Brown, Potestative Conditions and Illusory Promises (1931) 4 Tulane
L. Rev. 396-439.
10. See note 4, supra.
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